ABSTRAC: This article examines three linked questions which are considered key elements for the confi guration of a products liability system. First, defect categories, i.e., manufacturing defects, design defects, and insuffi cient warnings. Second, how to determine whether the design of a product is defective. Two possibilities become available at this point: consumer expectations test or risk-utility analysis. And, fi nally, whether to apply negligence or strict liability in cases of damages caused by defective products.
INTRODUCTION
Products liability is a highly controversial issue in the United States due to the striking nature of some cases, the enormous sums awarded by the juries and the diffi culty that ordinary citizens encounter when attempting to understand the rationale of rulings in such cases 1 . They not only capture the attention of lawyers, judges, scholars, and specialists, but * This paper was prepared by the author in the framework of the Project: "Products Liability in Latin America" in his attendance as Visiting Researcher at the Hauser Global Law School Program of New York University. ** Civil Law Professor, Pontifi cia Universidad Católica de Chile. Email: jagonzac@uc.cl. 1 Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, also known as the "McDonald's coffee case," is an emblematic one. It's a 1994 product liability lawsuit that became a fl ashpoint in the debate in the U.S. over tort reform after a jury awarded $2.86 million to a woman who burned herself with hot coffee. The trial judge reduced the total award to $640,000, and the parties settled for a confi dential amount before an appeal was decided. The case entered popular understanding as an example of frivolous litigation; ABC News calls the case "the poster child of excessive lawsuits". On February 27, 1992, Stella Liebeck, a 79-year-old woman from Albuquerque, New Mexico, ordered a 49¢ cup of coffee from the drive-through window of a local McDonald's restaurant. Liebeck was in the passenger's seat of her Ford Probe, and her grandson Chris parked the car so that Liebeck could add cream and sugar to her coffee. She placed the coffee cup between her knees and pulled the far side of the lid toward her to remove it. In the process, she spilled the entire cup of coffee on her lap. Liebeck was wearing also that of the media in general. Latin America has an extraordinary opportunity to legislate about this matter, avoiding the excesses of the American experience and making the best of the long and rich case law of the United States and Europe in this fi eld.
The central objective of this article is to make a comparative analysis of three fundamental questions concerning this matter in Europe and the United States 2 .
First, defect types. On the one hand, we have the model of the Restatement (Third) of Torts by the American Law Institute (ALI), which distinguishes between manufacturing defects, design defects, and insuffi cient warnings. On the other hand, we have the European model, whose Products Liability Directive does not establish distinctions between defect types.
Second, criteria for determining whether a product is defective from the point of view of its design. Broadly speaking, there are two possible approaches: consumer expectations test or risk-utility analysis.
Third, standard of liability: negligence (to impose liability only in cases in which there is fault) or strict liability (to impose liability without regard to fault).
In very general terms, strict liability is applied in Europe and no distinctions are made among defect types. In the United States, the Restatement Second also imposes strict liability without making a distinction, whereas the Restatement Third distinguishes defect categories, and applies strict liability only in case of manufacturing defects and negligence in the other two defect categories. In Europe, the consumer expectations test is prevalent, whereas the United States favors either the risk-utility test, the consumer expectations test, or a combination of both.
The legislative choice on each of these three aspects is important for the confi guration of a liability system and its consequences.
For instance, concerning the empirical effects of products liability policy, the debate between professors Whitford and Priest is well-known. In Professor Whitford's opinion, the policy adopted by courts over the 1960s and 1970s -the expansion of manufacturer liability beyond that undertaken in warranties, that is to say, the application of strict liability-is likely to have reduced the rate of product defects. According to Priest`s investment theory, on the other hand, the expansion of manufacturer liability is likely to have increased the rate of defects and the rate of consumer injuries 3 .
Professor Epstein acknowledges that the rapid increase in the overall level of products litigation has been matched by a long and steady decline in accidents level, but he observes that "the relationship between the improved accident picture and the changes in tort liability area seems weak at best. The decline in accident rates started before the expansion cotton sweatpants; they absorbed the coffee and held it against her skin as she sat in the puddle of hot liquid for over 90 seconds, scalding her thighs, buttocks, and groin. Liebeck was taken to the hospital, where it was determined that she had suffered third-degree burns on six percent of her skin and lesser burns over sixteen percent. She remained in the hospital for eight days while she underwent skin grafting. Two years of treatment followed. 2 For a comparative discussion of American law and the European Products Liability Directive, see, e.g., Culhane (1995) ; Howells (2000) ; Howells & Mildred (1998) ; ; Thieffry, Van Doorn & Lowe (1989) . 3 The arguments of each author can be viewed in Priest (1981) ; Priest (1982) ; Whitford (1982). in tort liability and continued uniformly even as the doctrinal expansion in the fi eld halted around 1990…The simplest explanation appears to be that technological improvements in safety are desired for their own sake, wholly apart from the choice of products liability regimes" 4 .
TYPES OF DEFECTS
In the United States, the Restatement Second of Torts (1965) did not distinguish types of product defects. It was the Restatement Third of Torts (1998) which made the well-known tri-partite distinction. In fact, Section 2 of the latter states that:
"Categories of Product Defects. A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product: (a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product; (b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe; (c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe" 5 .
To illustrate, the example of a car can be used. If a specifi c car is manufactured with defective tires, it is a manufacturing defect; by contrast, if all automobiles of the same brand and model have the same defect, it is a design defect, and, fi nally, if the damages were caused by an inadequate warning about the usage and characteristics of said tires, it is a case of insuffi cient warning.
Manufacturing defects are considered relatively minor because they involve individual products only.
Design defects and inadequate warnings cases are economically more important because they affect entire product lines.
In Europe, on the other hand, the European Products Liability Directive 6 does not establish distinctions between defect types and applies the same rules to all of them.
The predominance of the consumer expectation test on a worldwide level is not necessarily due to its superior merits. More likely, as Reimann writes, it is mainly a result of timing. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was the state of the art in the United States. Thus, when the Europeans imported American product liability ideas in the 1970s and 1980s, they also imported the consumer expectation test. In the 1980s and 1990s, many other countries around the world adopted the European model in turn and took the consumer expectation test as part of the package, thus helping it to prevail on a worldwide level. Ironically however, the Europeans and others apparently overlooked the fact that by the time they adopted the consumer expectation test, the Americans had come to doubt its adequacy: by the late 1970s, they had either replaced or at least supplemented it with a risk-utility analysis. This sequence of events may have long-term consequences. If the United States continues to move further towards the risk-utility paradigm while other countries stick to the consumer expectation test (which is likely at least where it has been codifi ed), the respective regimes will continue to diverge 13 .
In the case of the USA, Conk points out that in the Restatement (Third) of Torts, the American Law Institute (ALI) announced a general rule to resolve the problem of the meaning of the word "defect," a problem that has haunted the law of torts since section 402A of the ALI's 1965 Restatement (Second) marked the beginning of the era of strict liability for defective products. The new rule 14 rejects consumer expectations as a reliable measure of defect and proposes that the key question is whether there existed a feasible alternative safer design, the omission of which was unreasonable 15 16 .
Conk adds that courts had long grappled with the problem of defi ning "defect," drawing on concepts such as warranty and the consumer's reasonable expectations. But they drew most successfully on risk-utility analysis, a negligence-based approach championed by John Wade, the successor to William Prosser as Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Wade offered a list of factors he deemed signifi cant in applying the "unreasonably dangerous" standard of the Restatement (Second) 17 :
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product -its utility to the user and to the public as a whole.
13 p. 769, n. 78. 14 Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) states that a product: "(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design…, and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe" (emphasis added). 15 See Restatement (Third) § 2 cmt. d: "Assessment of a product design in most instances requires a comparison between an alternative design and the product design that caused the injury, undertaken from the viewpoint of a reasonable person. That approach is also used in administering the traditional reasonableness standard in negligence… The policy reasons that support use of a reasonable-person perspective in connection with the general negligence standard also support its use in the products liability contexts". 16 See Conk (2000) p. 1087. 17 Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) says: "(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability…" (emphasis added).
(2) The safety aspects of the product -the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury. (3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe. (4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility. (5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product. (6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions. (7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance 18 .
In Conk's opinion the "alternative-safer-design" rule of the Restatement (Third) is the vindication of Wade's view that design-defect litigation should turn on whether the product could have and should have been made safer before it was sold 19 .
B.
Criticism of consumer expectationst and risk-utility
Both tests have been praised and criticized for their advantages and disadvantages.
The most obvious downsides of the consumer expectation test are that it leads to the acceptance of products that are so dangerous that no reasonable person can overlook it, and that it fails when there are no reasonable expectations at all, e.g., because consumers do not know what to expect for lack of experience or expertise 20 . As Professor Wade has said "in many situations, particularly involving design matters, the consumer would not know what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the product could be made" 21 .
The test was rejected by the Model Uniform Product Liability Act, which states that the consumer expectations test "takes subjectivity to its most extreme end. Each trier of fact is likely to have a different understanding of abstract consumer expectations" 22 .
In Kysar's wo rds the consumer expectations test for design defectiveness "has become products liability's version of the rule against perpetuities: a doctrine nearly uni-18 See Wade (1973) pp. 837-38. Many courts, including those in New Jersey and California, have derived their risk-utility tests from Wade. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978 ) (adopting the following fi ve factors in its design-defect analysis: the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the fi nancial cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result from an alternative design); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng 'g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 826-27 (N.J. 1978 ) (citing Wade's factors in its design-defect analysis). But see Henderson & Twerski (1991) versally reviled but stubbornly and inexplicably persistent". Purporting to arise from the venerable section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the test actually appears to represent a gross misreading of that section. From this questionable origin, the consumer expectations test rose to prominence during the products liability revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. Even during the doctrine's heyday, however, academic commentators were expressing reservations about its attempt to rest product design liability on the simple but essentially formless question of whether a product disappointed the safety expectations of an "ordinary consumer" 23 . Indeed, by the 1980s, a consensus view among products liability scholars emerged that the consumer expectations test was both indefensible in theory and unworkable in practice 24 . In its stead, scholars advocated the explicit cost-benefi t balancing approach of the primary alternative doctrine that courts had developed for determining design defectiveness, the risk-utility test. Finally, as products liability entered its fourth decade of confusion concerning the scope and signifi cance of the consumer expectations test, the American Law Institute appointed Professors Henderson and Twerski, two academic critics of judicial expansion of product manufacturer liability, as co-Reporters of the ALI's ambitious and important project, the Restatement (Third) of Torts. Kysar concludes that when the ALI eventually adopted the results of the Reporters' prodigious efforts on May 20, 1997, it endorsed a set of black-letter statements that fi nally and defi nitively rejected the consumer expectations test as an independent test for product design defect in favor of the more analytically sound risk-utility test 25 .
The risk-utility paradigm, in turn, has been criticized because it may accept even gross and hidden dangers simply because they keep a product cheap or otherwise useful, and it may impair consumer autonomy if courts dictate safety devices neither desired by the market nor endorsed by the political process 26 .
Moreover, it has been said that alternative design requirement ("micro-balancing" version of the risk-utility test) of the Third Restatement places an "undue burden" on plaintiffs by requiring them to use expert evidence in every design defect case. The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff: "To establish a prima facie case of defect, the plaintiff must prove the availability of a technologically feasible and practical alternative design that would have reduced or prevented the plaintiff 's harm" 27 . (The Restatement (Second) relieved plaintiffs from proving negligence on the part of the manufacturer). 
C. Judicial reception of the Third Restatement

D. Trends
According to Professor Epstein the two-pronged Barker formulation seems the dominant norm today 41 . In this case the court said a product is defective in design "if (1) the plaintiff proves that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) the plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately caused injury and the defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that on balance the benefi ts of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design…" and in evaluating the adequacy of a product's design pursuant to this latter standard, a jury may consider, among other relevant factors, "the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the fi nancial cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result from an alternative design…". The court noted "this dual standard for design defect assures an injured plaintiff protection from products that either fall bellow ordinary consumer expectations as to safety, or that, on balance, are not as safely designed as they should be. At the same time, the standard permits a manufacturer who has marketed a product which satisfi es ordinary consumer expectations to demonstrate the relative complexity of design decisions and the tradeoffs that are frequently required in the adoption of alternative designs. Finally, this test refl ects our continued adherence to the principle that, in a product liability action, the trier of fact must focus on the product, not on the manufacturer's conduct, and that the plaintiff need not prove that the manufacturer acted unreasonably or negligently in order to prevail in such an action…" 42 E.
Design Defects and "State of the Art"
In connection with design defects an unresolved problem is whether a manufacturer should be liable for dangers unknowable at the time of manufacture, in other words, whether a "state of the art" defense is available.
In Europe, one usually speaks of the "development risk", though the European Products Liability Directive does not use that expression. The Directive allows this defense 43 . While it also permits the member states to exclude it 44 .
In the Unites States, cases on this matter have been inconsistent even within one and the same jurisdiction 45 . The reason for this is that although statutorily prescribed in many states, there is no uniform meaning of "state of the art". It either refers to industry custom or to the most advanced technology commercially used, or to scientifi cally known cutting-edge technology 46 . Conformance with the third standard will typically preclude liability 47 , while conformance with the fi rst and second standards rarely, if ever, gives rise to an absolute defense 48 . Among the few jurisdictions that do recognize this defense -typically based on the second standard of advanced technology-no uniformity exists as to the temporal dimension of state of the art. Some jurisdictions focus on the state of the art at the time the product was designed, while others examine the state of the art at the time the product was placed on the market 49 . Even though most jurisdictions do not recognize industry custom and commercially used advanced technology as absolute defense, these criteria are relevant when examining the feasibility of an alternative design. In other words, these standards play a role in determining the defectiveness of the product's design 50 . 42 Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978) 43 European Directive, supra note 6, art. 7 (e) "The producer shall not be liable as a result of this Directive if he proves: that the state of scientifi c and technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered". 44 European Directive, supra note 6, art. 15 (1)(b) "Each Member State may: by way of derogation from Article 7 (e), maintain or…, provide in their legislation that the producer shall be liable even if he proves that the state of scientifi c and technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of a defect to be discovered". 45 Compare Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) with Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984 
NEGLIGENCE OR STRICT LIABILITY
A. Restatements of Torts (American Law Institute) and liability regime Through most of the twentieth century, products liability law steadily evolved toward protection of consumers, culminating in the 1960s and 1970s with widespread judicial acceptance of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which imposed liability on manufacturers for injuries caused by dangerous products, without regard to fault ("strict liability").
Section 402A imposed liability even where the manufacturer "exercised all possible care" to avoid harm due to products in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. The section reads as follows: (1) Supreme Courts sought to use tort law as a tool for consumer protection. The ALI's adoption of section 402A imparted credibility to this effort because of the prestige of the ALI and the strong consensus among its leading voices that strict liability was the proper rule. With the issuance of the Restatement (Second), "the concept of strict liability for defective products became institutionalized" 54 .
"Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection
However, as Conk has pointed out Section 402A contained an internal tension: Its declaration that a manufacturer would be liable even if it "exercised all possible care in the 51 Restatement (Second), supra note 7, § 402A. 52 161 A.2d 69, 77 (N.J. 1960 ) (recognizing the general principle that a manufacturer's duty runs directly to the consumer when the manufacturer markets its products directly to the consumer). 53 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) ("A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being"). 54 See Conk (2000) pp. 1091-1092. The quotations in this paragraph all come from this source. preparation and sale of [its] product" was bounded by its application only to products that were "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property" 55 . Thus, the section's strict-liability rule was tempered by a negligence-based concept of defect 56 . Conk adds that Dean Prosser, who served as a Reporter for the Restatement (Second), noted the tension between strict liability and negligence in section 402A: "Since proper design is a matter of reasonable fi tness, the strict liability adds little or nothing to negligence [on the part of the manufacturer]; but it becomes more important in the case of a dealer who does not design the product" 57 . Birnbaum holds a similar view, and has therefore criticized said section as reintroducing negligence elements 58 .
Section 1 of the Restatement Third, as opposed to Section 402 A of the Restatement Second, points out that:
"Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor for Harm Caused by Defective Products. One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect" 59 .
Then, in its section 2, for purposes of determining liability under section 1, distinguishes three categories of product defects.
The writing of these sections is noticeably different from that of Section 402A of Restament Second. It must be observed that the new Restatement imposes liability even though "all possible care was exercised" in the preparation and marketing of the product only in the case of manufacturing defect. Its predecessor, on the other hand, imposed liability even where the manufacturer "exercised all possible care" to any defect.
The change refl ects the thought of the American Law Institute Reporters for the Restatement Third James Henderson and Aaron Twerski, who had been harsh critics of the strict-liability movement 60 . As they clearly wrote in comment a of section 2 "In general, the rationale for imposing strict liability on manufacturers for harm caused by manufacturing defects does not apply in the context of imposing liability for defective design and defects based on inadequate instruction or warning" 61 . I analyze this later.
B.
European Union and liability regime
The European Products Liability Directive proclaims strict liability directly and indirectly.
It does so directly in the preface. It starts by saying that approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning the liability of the producer for damage caused by the 55 Restatement (Second), supra note 7, § 402A (1). 56 See Conk (2000) defectiveness of his products is necessary because the existing divergences may distort competition and affect the movement of goods within the common market and entail a differing degree of protection of the consumer against damage caused by a defective product to his health or property; and it concludes that "liability without fault on the part of the producer is the sole means of adequately solving the problem, peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technological production" 62 .
The Directive announces strict liability indirectly in its article 4 when it says: "The injured person shall (only) be required to prove the damage, the defect and the causal relationship between defect and damage" 63 . Note that this article does not require the plaintiff to prove fault.
In his comparative study of products liability regimes, Reimann says that it is true that the European Directive proclaims strict liability but nonetheless implicitly relies on notions of due care in at least two ways. First, it considers a product defective if it is "not as safe as a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account" 64 . But, according to Reimann, making (and releasing) such a product "smacks of negligence". Second, the crucial moment to judge the product's defectiveness is "the time when it was put into circulation" 65 ; in particular, the defendant can escape liability by showing that the defect was unavoidable given the technical or scientifi c knowledge at the time 66 . In other words, if the defendant did everything possible back then, he will not be liable today, even if the product has since turned out to be unreasonably dangerous. Again, liability really turns on blameworthiness. A truly strict regime would judge purely the product, and it would do so purely at the time of the judgment (or, at most, at the time of the accident) 67 .
Reimann leaves open the question whether these fault-related considerations turn the EC Directive's approach (and others modeled after it) partially into a camoufl aged negligence regime or whether liability is still strict in principle 68 . Be that as it may, for Reimann, there is no denying that under it, courts cannot decide design and warning cases without applying some kind of reasonableness standard. At the minimum, strict liability is somewhat ameliorated 69 .
C
Debate over strict liability
Many authors have written on strict products liability and many explanations have been advanced to justify or criticize it. I have chosen some authors whose thoughts I think properly summarize the vast literature on that subject.
Montgomery and Owen catalogue the rationales behind strict products liability as follow: (1) Manufacturers convey to the public a general sense of product quality through the use of mass advertising and merchandising practices, causing consumers to rely for their protection upon the skill and expertise of the manufacturing community; (2) Consumer no longer have the ability to protect themselves adequately from defective products due to the vast number and complexity of products which must be "consumed" in order to function in modern society; (3) Sellers are often in a better position than consumers to identify the potential product risks, to determine the acceptable levels of such risks, and to confi ne the risks within those levels; (4) A majority of product accidents not caused by product abuse are probably attributable to the negligent acts or omissions of manufacturers at some stage of the manufacturing or marketing process, yet the diffi culties of discovering and proving this negligence are often practicably insurmountable; (5) Negligence liability is generally insuffi cient to induce manufacturers to market adequately safe products; (6) Sellers almost invariably are in a better position than consumers to absorb or spread the costs of product accidents, and (7) The costs of injuries fl owing from typical risks inherent in products can fairly be put upon the enterprises marketing the products as a cost of their doing business, thus assuring that these enterprises will fully "pay their way" in the society from which they derive their profi ts 70 .
Glenn, in turn, wonders why does a legal order resort to what is known as strict liability? According to this author, wherever a legal tradition is said to be developed, that is to say, capable of responding in a reasonably articulate fashion to the full range of modern dilemmas, there will be a similar tendency to burden the manufacturer with a larger compensatory role. This is not only because of the sympathy necessarily engendered by physical injury; it is also, and more importantly, because of the larger role played by the manufacturer. Manufacturing has itself been with us for millennia, but more recently that which has been made by the hand (manufactura) has been replaced by the product of the machine. Machine production is systemic production; systemic production requires both systemic design and systemic distribution. The notion of system implies structure and interdependence, and arguments for the internalization of social costs of production are the natural outgrowth of the process of systematization which has already taken place in the manufacturing process itself. Such costs are part of the larger universe of manufacturing; since they are part of it they must be internalized by it. Arguments for stricter forms of liability will emerge therefore in any legal tradition suffi ciently developed to recognize what is occurring about it in the industrial and technological world 71 .
For Priest "the true foundation for the strict liability standard was... the accumulated effect of thirty years of scholarship that had created a consensus about the relatively inferior bargaining power of consumers, the importance of internalizing costs to manufacturers, and the benefi ts of spreading risks broadly through manufacturer insurance. These propositions at the time were uncontroversial, and strict liability follows inescapably from them" 72 . 70 See Montgomery & Owen (1976) pp. 809-810. 71 See Glenn (1990) pp. 556-557. 72 See Priest (1985) p. 517.
Comment c of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) makes clear that the ALI's preference for the expanded standard was motivated by all of these considerations. The drafters of section 402A explained that "On whatever theory, the justifi cation for the strict liability has been said to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsability toward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the products" 73 .
Another of the public policy rationales for the rule of strict products liability is the information imbalance between manufacturers and consumers. In the real world the parties are never perfectly informed; nor are they equally well informed. Producers generally are much better informed about product risks and the likelihood of liability than are consumers. This is so for at least four reasons. First, a producer obtains important information about the nature of its products in the course of designing and manufacturing them 74 . Second, a producer has a much greater stake in obtaining additional information, because it is potentially affected by all accident costs, rather than by the portion that will be visited upon a single accident victim (discounted by the probability of injury to a particular consumer) 75 . Third, consumers lack the means to acquire information about latent product risks 76 . Fourth, much of consumers' limited information about products (especially new products) is derived from producers who have an incentive to downplay risk (as long as they expect to bear less than the full cost of resulting accidents) 77 78 .
More recently, Zekoll has said that some arguments in support of strict liability derive from fairness concerns for victims, such as providing compensation for the injured plaintiff 79 and alleviating his diffi culties in proving manufacturer negligence 80 . Others dwell on consumer expectations in the safety and integrity of the product 81 . However, according to Zekoll, most salient for the doctrinal development of strict liability, and its recent decline in design and warning cases, have been two welfare economics arguments that inhere in enterprise liability theory. The fi rst rationale rests on the assumption that manufacturers are in the best position to spread risks by purchasing liability insurance and 81 See, e.g., Shapo (1995) p. 666; Little (1994 Little ( ) pp. 1203 Little ( -1204 by passing these costs on to the public through increased prices 82 . The second argument stresses deterrence, the role of strict liability as an incentive for manufacturers to increase their investment in product safety, to make its products safer 83 .
Section 2, comment a of the Restatement (Third) highlights deterrence as a primary tort objective: "The emphasis is on creating incentives for manufacturers to achieve optimal levels of safety in designing and marketing products. Society does not benefi t from products that are excessively safe -for example, automobiles designed with maximum speeds of 20 miles per hour-any more than it benefi ts from products that are too risky. Society benefi ts most when right, or optimal, amount of product safety is achieved" 84 .
Finally, it has been said that strict liability likely reduces litigation costs, because a plaintiff need only prove causation, not negligence. When it is clear that the product caused the plaintiff 's harm, parties under a strict liability regime are prone to settle out of court, because only damages are in dispute.
Critics charge that strict liability incentivizes product misuse (particularly in jurisdictions where this may not be a defense) and creates a moral hazard problem on the part of potential buyers. Reasoning that consumers will recover regardless of the amount of care they take in using the product, critics assert that consumers will underinvest in care even when they are the least-cost avoiders, thus leading to a lower aggregate level of care than under a negligence standard.
While proponents assert that the producer can build the cost into the price as insurance, critics argue that this assertion is ignorant of economics and only holds true in inelastic regions of the demand curve. As a result of strict liability for their products, manufacturers may not produce the socially optimal level of goods. Particularly within elastic regions of the demand curve, where consumers are very price-sensitive, the manufacturer by defi nition cannot pass on the economic costs to the consumers as a form of insurance without pricing many of those consumers out of the market for that good. However, because consumers are not willing to pay for this insurance, proponents of strict liability would argue that this is evidence of a product whose harm outweighs its good, in which case it should be removed from the market.
Critics also argue that applying strict liability to products results in substantially higher transaction costs. One example of these transaction costs is the creation of maintenance of legal disclaimers on products that would be unnecessary to the reasonable person -such as the ubiquitous instructions "not for human consumption" labeling on an inordinate number of non-food items. This results in a waste of time and resources for the producers who have to create these warnings, decreasing the producer surplus from trade. This also lowers the consumer surplus from these transactions, as all reasonably diligent consumers will read the unnecessary instructions, whereas the consumers likely to misuse the product are unlikely to be suffi ciently diligent to read the instructions. D. The need to distinguish categories of defects to determine the liability regime.
Some believe that the most adequate solution to decide which liability regime should be applied -negligence or strict liability-is to make a distinction between the different defect categories. Different types of defects necessitate different standards of liability.
As Zekoll aptly summarizes, manufacturing defect entails true strict liability because manufacturers cannot exonerate themselves by proving that they exercised all possible care in the production and marketing of the product. The imposition of strict liability under this concept has met with general approval. The reasons range from effi ciency rationales, such as creating greater incentives to safety, to fairness considerations favoring the plaintiff 's expectations about the absence of hidden defects 85 .
Regarding design defects, most states have adopted some form of a risk-utility balancing test to determine whether a product's design is defective. The inquiry under this test often focuses on whether a reasonable alternative design existed and whether the alternative would provide greater safety at reasonable cost without unduly impairing the utility of the product. Thus, rather than examining the product in light of consumer expectations, this test evaluates the defendant's decision to choose one design over another. This conductoriented approach necessitates considerations that are akin to if not identical with those employed in negligence cases. The ultimate question in both categories is whether the defendant's choice comports with that of a reasonable person 86 .
The third defect category, the failure to issue adequate warnings or instructions, also remains largely rooted in traditional negligence principles. According to the Restatement Third the test is whether "foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings". Obviously, the notions of foreseeability and reasonableness are core ingredients of the negligence action, and most courts continue to impose a fault-based standard on the plaintiff who must prove that the defendant knew or should have known of the risks that caused damages to the plaintiff 87 88 .
Zekoll adds that the broad application of strict liability rules during the 1960s and 1970s has been criticized as providing inappropriate solutions in design defect and failureto-warn cases. While this criticism has many facets, its core consists of the observation that design choices and warnings cannot be perfect, but can at best minimize knowable risks without compromising the utility of the product 89 . Based, furthermore, on the assumption that liability for unknowable risks not only fails to advance accident prevention, but also results in undesirable insurance effects 90 , critics conclude that the imposition of strict liability is neither fair (in the moral sense 91 ) nor effi cient (both from deterrence and risk- Owen (1993) . spreading perspectives 92 ). These critics argue that applying negligence rules in design and warnings contexts advances fairness objectives and creates a superior incentive structure that includes the responsibility of consumers to use products in a prudent fashion 93 94 .
Henderson, one of the Reporters for the Restatement Third, also distinguishes defect categories to determine the liability regime: accepts "strict liability" for manufacturing defects because liability in such cases is determined narrowly and objectively, by reference to the manufacturer's own standards 95 . He rejects strict liability in design and warning defect cases because without an objective standard courts will inappropriately second-guess product decisions 96 .
The Restatement Third says that in contrast to manufacturing defects (strict liability), design defects and defects based on inadequate instructions or warnings are predicated on a different concept of responsibility.
In the first place, such defects cannot be determined by reference to the manufacturer's own design or marketing standards because those standards are the very ones that plaintiffs attack as unreasonable. Some sort of independent assessment of advantages and disadvantages, to which some attach the label "risk-utility balancing," is necessary. Products are not generically defective merely because they are dangerous. Many product-related accident costs can be eliminated only by excessively sacrifi cing product features that make products useful and desirable. Thus, the various trade-offs need to be considered in determining whether accidents costs are more fairly and effi ciently borne by accident victims, on the one hand, or, on the other hand, by consumers generally through the mechanism of higher product prices attributable to liability costs imposed by courts on product sellers.
Moreover, consumer expectations as to proper product design or warning are typically more diffi cult to discern than in the case of a manufacturing defect.
Finally, the element of deliberation in setting appropriate levels of design safety is not directly analogous to the setting of levels of quality control by the manufacturer. When a manufacturer sets its quality control at a certain level, it is aware that a given number of products may leave the assembly line in a defective condition and cause injury to innocent victims who can generally do nothing to avoid injury. The implications of deliberately drawing lines with respect to product design safety are different. A reasonably designed product still carries with it elements of risk that must be protected against by the user or consumer since some risks cannot be designed out of the product at reasonable cost 97 .
E. Trends
In 2003, Reimann wrote that it is unlikely that liability for faulty products will become substantively stricter than it is today. In Europe, there are no signs of that. In recent 92 See Priest (1987) years, the European Commission has considered a long list of changes to the EC Directive favoring plaintiffs 98 . But, with the exception of including unprocessed agricultural products, no action was taken and the Directive will probably remain as it is in the foreseeable future. Nor are individual countries likely to move towards stricter standards. In the orbit of the European model, the development towards strict liability seems to have peaked and leveled off. In the United States, it has actually begun to turn back. Rather than continuing on the expansive course of the 1960s and 1970s, American product liability law has become distinctly more cautious in the 1980s and 1990s. Particularly in design and warning cases, the pendulum has swung from a rhetoric of strictness back to a standard reminiscent of negligence. Seven years ago, the Third Restatement openly acknowledged and supported this trend when it announced that liability in such cases turns on the foreseeability of risks and the reasonableness of precautions 99 . What is more, courts have become signifi cantly more conservative as well 100 . In the last two decades or so, most of them have refused to expand liability further, and some have in fact retreated to earlier positions 101 102 .
According to Zekoll the often posed question whether strict liability prevailed over negligence can be summarized as follows: Strict liability prevails in manufacturing defect cases, while negligence principles have gained the upper hand in design defect and failureto-warn disputes 103 . In general, the trend over the past twenty-fi ve years has been to roll back some of the judicial innovations that benefi ted plaintiffs in the 1960s and 1970s 104 . 98 They have ranged from reversing the burden of proof for defectiveness and eliminating the development risk defense to abolishing liability limits and changing prescription periods. 99 Arguably, this change in theory is mainly a (belated) recognition that in practice, liability was rarely truly strict to begin with in design and warning cases, see Stapleton (1999) 
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OPTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE CONTRACTOR DEFEATED IN TRIAL BY LAESIO ENORMIS. ORIGINS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE ARTICLE 1890 OF THE CHILEAN CIVIL CODE
Nathalie Walker Silva* RESUMEN: La noción de lesión enorme plasmada en el artículo 1890 del Código Civil Chileno se remonta al Derecho romano. Difi ere de la lesión enorme del Code Napoléon al poder aplicarse tanto al comprador como al vendedor, y al ser regulada de manera objetiva. El reconocimiento de la lesión enorme por sentencia ejecutoriada abre al contratante un derecho de opción a mantener vigente el contrato, o a consentir en su rescisión, la cual se confi gura como un tipo especial de nulidad. En caso de rescisión, la parte que ha lesionado siempre se queda con una décima parte del justo precio. Este no es sino uno de los problemas planteados por los efectos del ejercicio de este derecho de opción, siendo el otro la evidente desigualdad entre la suerte del vendedor y del comprador, en desmedro de este último.
Palabras clave: lesión enorme, justo precio, efectos de la rescisión por lesión enorme, recepción de la lesión enorme en el Código Civil chileno.
ABSTRACT:
The concept known as laesio enormis which is to be found in article 1890 of the Chilean civil code harks back to Roman law. It is different from the one from the Napoleon Code insofar as it applies to both buyer and seller, according to an objective standard. Once the laesio enormis is acknowledged by the judge, the contract can either remains valid or become null and void, albeit in a distinctive way. If this so-called rescission is called for, the party which was unfair to the other one always keeps a ten percent of the just price. This is the fi rst problem of the consequences of the rescission, the second one being the obvious unbalance between the fates of seller and buyer, to the advantage of the seller. 
LA LESIÓN ENORME EN EL CONTRATO DE COMPRAVENTA. ORÍGENES DEL CONCEPTO Y SU RECEPCIÓN EN EL CÓDIGO CIVIL
La lesión enorme es una institución que ha causado arduas controversias en doctrina, en cuanto a sus orígenes, justifi cación y utilidad 1 .
Se indica con frecuencia que el origen remoto de la lesión enorme está en Roma, con las Leyes 2 y 8 de rescindenda venditionis 2 . Este origen no ha estado exento de discusión en cuanto a la existencia y aplicación de esos rescriptos, atribuidos a los emperadores Diocleciano y Maximiano 3 .
1 Dentro de las posturas más radicales, que le niegan utilidad, encontramos la de Alessandri, quien ha señalado -entre otras razones-que la ley no debe tomar partido por uno de los contratantes cuando existe igualdad de condiciones y capacidad de las partes. Ver Alessandri (1918) De ambas leyes, esta es la más afamada y citada por la doctrina. Su traducción es la siguiente: "Si tú o tu padre hubiereis vendido a un precio menor una cosa de mayor precio, es razonable o, que restituyendo tú el precio a los compradores, recobres el fundo mediante la autoridad del juez, o bien, si el comprador lo prefi ere, recibas tú lo que falta para el precio justo. Parece ser precio menor, si no se ha pagado ni la mitad del precio verdadero". Traducción de García (1962) Traducción: "Si tu hijo -con tu consentimiento-ha vendido tu fundo, para obtener su nulidad, deberás justifi car el dolo resultante de los artifi cios y acechanzas del adquirente, o la amenaza de tormentos corporales, y aun de muerte, que empleó para obligarle a otorgar el contrato. Por cuanto el solo motivo de que alegaras que el fundo no se vendió por su justo valor, no bastaría para hacer rescindir la venta. En efecto, si consideras la naturaleza del contrato de venta; si atiendes a que el vendedor trata de comprar al menor precio posible, y que los deseos del vendedor son los de obtener lo que más pueda, y que no llegan a entenderse ni a ajustar su contrato sino después de muchas discusiones, el vendedor disminuyendo poco a poco el primitivo precio, y el comprador por su parte añadiendo algo a lo primeramente ofrecido, y que al fi n convienen en un precio, comprenderás, entonces, que ni la buena fe -que es la esencia del contrato de venta-, ni ninguna otra razón permiten que se te conceda por este solo motivo la rescisión de un contrato terminado por consentimiento mutuo. A no ser que se te hubiese dado un precio menor a la mitad del valor del fundo cuando tuvo lugar la venta, debiéndose en tal caso conceder al comprador la elección arriba ofrecida". Traducción libre, en base a la efectuada por Merello (1989) p. 117. El primer rescripto -Lex 2-aparece fechado en el año 285. El segundo, dataría del año 293. En cuanto a las fechas, resulta lógico considerar que uno de los fundamentos de la rescisión contenida en los rescriptos sería el de proteger a los pequeños terratenientes de las consecuencias de la crisis que sacudió al Imperio Romano en el siglo III d. de C. En este sentido, Manuel Abril Campoy adhiere a esta doctrina, pero considera que el fundamento de la rescisión está en un conjunto de condicionantes, no solo en razones económicas y sociales. Véase Abril (2003) p. 21. 3 Tampoco esta ley ha estado ajena a la discusión sobre posibles interpolaciones. En este punto, podemos citar, Pese a lo anterior, se puede afi rmar que las fuentes regularmente consultadas por Bello no manifi estan dudas, al menos en torno a su existencia 4 .
Luego de esos rescriptos, no existe mayor claridad sobre la evolución de la normativa aplicada, antes de ser recogida en las Partidas. Entre nosotros, Alessandri opina que la Lex 2 "no tuvo una aplicación muy frecuente y aun llegó a ser abolida por el emperador Teodosio II" 5 . Pero a pesar de todo, Justiniano la reprodujo en su Código. Afi rma el autor que "solo cuando los Papas Alejandro e Inocencio la proclamaron, a fi nes del siglo XI y a comienzos del XII, como muy conformes con las doctrinas canónicas, esta institución fue aceptada sin discusión por todas las legislaciones de la época. Por eso la encontramos en Francia y en las leyes españolas" 6 .
La doctrina de la lesión enorme fue recogida en las Siete Partidas del Rey Alfonso X, quedando asentada en la Partida V, Título 5º, Ley 56 7 y en la Partida IV, Título 11º, ley 16 8 . dentro de muchos ejemplos en igual sentido, a John W. Baldwin: "Grammatical diffi culties within the passage itself showed unmistakable evidences of interpolation and raised strong doubts as to its origins during the reign of Diocletian. The terminology showed certain inconsistencies". Véase Baldwin (1599) De las Siete Partidas, pasa al ordenamiento de Alcalá 9 y luego a la Novísima Recopilación, sin modifi caciones importantes.
El principio sustentado en las Partidas es incorporado con posterioridad en el Code Napoléon, en el de la Luisiana, el Italiano, el Bávaro, el Austriaco y el Prusiano, con rasgos propios en cada caso 10 . De todos estos cuerpos legales, sin duda el más infl uyente fue el primero, aunque nuestra recepción fi nal de la teoría de la lesión enorme está en gran parte inspirada también en la normativa existente en las Partidas. Prueba de esto es la nota al artículo 2067 del Proyecto de 1853 -que consagra la lesión enorme en la compraventa-, en que se cita directamente a la Ley 56, título 5, Partida 5ª 11 .
El articulado original del Código Civil chileno no ha sufrido modifi cación alguna en esta materia a lo largo de los años. Sí ha habido cambios introducidos por leyes especiales, como el artículo 170 del Código de Minería 12 , que hace inaplicable la rescisión de la venta por lesión enorme a la compraventa o permuta de una concesión minera, debido a que se 10 Así lo expone García Goyena, quien no era partidario de sancionar la lesión. Al exponer las particularidades de la recepción en cada uno de esos Códigos, expresa: "tanta perplejidad y contradicción no son la mejor prueba o apología de la justicia y conveniencia de esta especie de rescisión". Véase García (1852) p. 178 y 179. 11 En el "Proyecto Inédito", en cambio, la nota al art. 2067 a, hace referencia a la Ley 16, título 11, Partida 4. Ya se ha transcrito el texto de la Ley en la nota Nº 8. De esa Ley, lo relevante para nuestro estudio se centra en un ejemplo referido a la compraventa, en los términos siguientes: "Et esto se entiende que debe ser guardado en la dote solamiente, ça en quanto quier que sea fecho el engaño en mas o menos de lo que vale la cosa, siempre debe seer desfecho, mostrando el engaño segunt que es dicho aquel que se tiene por engañado. Mas esto non est en los otros pleitos; ça non est tenudo de desfacer el engaño el que el feciere, fueras en de si montase mas ó menos dotro tanto del prescio derecho que vale la cosa: et esto serie como si alguno vendiese la cosa que valiese veinte maravedis por quarenta et uno, ó la que valiese quarenta maravedis por diez et nueve" (la letra en negrita es nuestra). 12 Art. 170 del Código de Minería: "No hay rescisión por causa de lesión enorme en los contratos de compraventa y de permuta de una concesión o de una cuota o de una parte material de ella". Otro cambio en la legislación es el que atañe a la forma de entender el concepto de "justo precio", según el artículo 85 de la Ley Nº 16.742, D.O. 8 de febrero de 1968. Dicho artículo dispone que "para los efectos del artículo 1889 del Código Civil, en los contratos de compraventa celebrados en cumplimiento de promesas de sitios que formen parte de un loteo hecho conforme a la Ley General de Construcciones y Urbanización, se entenderá que el justo precio se refi ere al tiempo de la celebración del contrato de promesa, cuando dicho precio se haya pagado de acuerdo con las estipulaciones de la promesa". trata de un contrato aleatorio, en el cual la suerte hace que el desequilibrio en las prestaciones sea un elemento de la esencia de dicho contrato.
En cambio, en los sucesivos proyectos de Código Civil, Andrés Bello fue perfi lando y adecuando la institución hasta dejarla satisfactoria según los cánones que él manejaba. En cualquier caso, en todos los proyectos de Código, la normativa amparaba tanto al vendedor como al comprador. Al resguardar los intereses de ambos contratantes, se desecha en esta parte la infl uencia del Code Napoléon, que solo otorga acción rescisoria al vendedor 13 , entendiendo que ha sufrido lesión enorme cuando ha sido perjudicado en más de siete duodécimas partes del precio de la fi nca. Podrá parecernos extraño, desde la óptica actual, que solo el vendedor que ha sufrido injusticia en el precio pueda alegar lesión y no el comprador. Esto tiene una explicación lógica si valoramos que uno de los fundamentos para incorporar la lesión en el Código Civil francés fue el proteger a los vendedores que celebraban compraventas a precios muy bajos, por la necesidad económica imperiosa que sufrieron al momento de pactar las condiciones del contrato 14 .
¿CUÁNDO SUFREN LAS PARTES LESIÓN ENORME EN EL CONTRATO DE COMPRAVENTA?
El artículo 1888 elimina cualquier duda en torno a la admisibilidad de la institución en estudio en la compraventa, al señalar que "el contrato de compraventa podrá rescindirse por lesión enorme". Al respecto, resultó meritorio el cambio de la palabra rescisión por la de resolución, que había sido utilizada en el encabezado del título 8 del Proyecto de 1842.
El artículo 1889, por su parte, señala:
"El vendedor sufre lesión enorme, cuando el precio que recibe es inferior a la mitad del justo precio de la cosa que vende; y el comprador a su vez sufre lesión enorme, cuando el justo precio de la cosa que compra es inferior a la mitad del precio que paga por ella. (2) El justo precio se refi ere al tiempo del contrato".
El Código no defi ne qué debe entenderse por justo precio. Será el juez quien deba determinarlo al conocer de un litigio en que se reclame la lesión enorme. El justo precio es el resultado de la opinión común 15 . Corresponde al valor venal o precio de mercado, es decir, aquel en que se transan comúnmente los inmuebles, considerando las características particulares que infl uyen en su valor 16 . En cualquier caso, es indudable que el califi cativo de "justo", hace referencia a la equidad que debe reinar en los contratos conmutativos. Es de esta opinión Juan Sala, quien admite que "como la equidad dicta que haya igualdad entre el precio y la cosa vendida, y por otra parte la pública utilidad exige que se cumplan y sean valederos los contratos, (…) [si la desigualdad] fuere en más de la mitad del justo precio, puede rescindirse la venta; pero no si es menor" 17 . Un perjuicio moderado no da lugar a la rescisión, ya que se presume que para evitar pleitos y disminuir la incertidumbre, los contratantes "se remiten mutuamente estos pequeños perjuicios, con tal de que no excedan la mitad del justo precio. De aquí la división del justo precio en sumo, medio e ínfi mo, de la que usan frecuentemente los teólogos; a fi n de que de otro modo no quede lastimada la justicia conmutativa. (…) Partiendo de estos principios, el Derecho Civil (…) no permitió que sirviera otro perjuicio para la rescisión de una venta sino el que excediese la mitad del justo precio; pues sería ya escandaloso que este se tolerara" 18 . La disposición citada presenta bastante similitud con el artículo 1681 del Code Napoléon, pero no haríamos justicia a la labor de Andrés Bello si dijéramos que es una mera reiteración de lo contemplado en el Code. En primer lugar, porque nuestro Código concede acción rescisoria también al comprador. Es destacable que Andrés Bello haya extendido la posibilidad de reclamar la lesión enorme al comprador, ya que en la actualidad no solo es admisible como argumento la imperiosa necesidad que lleva a una de las partes a contratar, sino también la ignorancia de las condiciones en que se ha vendido, la que puede afectar a cualquiera de las dos partes del contrato. Luego, porque ha regulado la lesión con carácter objetivo, no siendo necesario indagar en las causas que provocaron el desequilibrio en las prestaciones 19 , sino solo determinar la desigualdad mediante un cálculo matemático 20 .
DERECHO DE OPCIÓN PARA EL CONTRATANTE VENCIDO
Nuestro Código se apartó deliberadamente de la tradición anterior -recogida en las partidas, y que pasó, por ejemplo, a las obras de Sala y Pothier-, en cuanto no consideró a la lesión como un vicio del consentimiento 21 . No se alude a la fuerza ni al engaño, sino que basta con probar en el juicio que se ha sobrepasado el límite admisible de desigualdad en las prestaciones. Quizá sea por esa intención de apartarse de las fuentes, que Bello eliminó el artículo 1638 del Proyecto de 1853, norma que consagraba la lesión como vicio en los contratos conmutativos 22 . En esa misma senda, eliminó también el artículo 1629 del mismo Proyecto, que consideraba como vicios del consentimiento al error, la fuerza, el dolo y la lesión.
El artículo 1890 inciso 1º da un derecho de opción al contratante contra quien se ha pronunciado la rescisión. Ese derecho consiste, en el caso del comprador, de consentir en la rescisión, o de restituir el exceso del precio recibido por sobre el justo precio, aumentado este en una décima parte. Y en el caso del vendedor, de aceptar la rescisión del contrato -dándose los efectos propios de la nulidad de la compraventa-, o restituir el exceso del precio recibido sobre el justo precio, aumentado este último en una décima parte.
El derecho de opción está establecido como una condición potestativa -además de una obligación facultativa 23 -que depende del solo arbitrio del contratante que ha lesio- 19 En tal sentido, el art. 1677 del Code Civil solo admite que el juez dé lugar a la lesión cuando los hechos resulten bastante verosímiles y graves como para hacer presumir la lesión. Una disposición similar fue incorporada por Bello en el artículo 381 del Proyecto de 1847. En ella se establece que: "el que alegue lesión enorme, deberá justifi car ignorancia del valor de la cosa al tiempo de perfeccionarse el contrato; ni se tendrá por justa ignorancia la que fuere imputable a negligencia aun leve". Como puede apreciarse, esta norma era más propia de una lesión-vicio, al atender a la voluntad afectada por la ignorancia o error. Al eliminarse esta norma en el "Proyecto inédito", desaparece con ella el último vestigio de la intención primitiva de Andrés Bello de considerar a la lesión como un vicio del consentimiento. 20 En este aspecto, es necesario atender al límite del precio irrisorio, ya que si el precio pagado o recibido es tan bajo para llegar a ese extremo, simplemente no hay venta, por no darse cumplimiento a un requisito de existencia del contrato. 21 Al respecto, nuestra jurisprudencia ha dicho que: "para las concepciones clásicas, en que se inspira nuestro Código, la lesión no es ni puede ser un vicio del consentimiento: es tan solo un vicio del contrato provocado por el desequilibrio en las prestaciones, que debe ser analizado con carácter objetivo y matemático (…). En cada especie, se verifi ca matemáticamente la equivalencia, y todas las veces que ella desaparezca, el acto será anulado porque hay enriquecimiento injusto para una persona en desmedro de otra. Véase Ana María Watkins Sepúlveda con Juan Watkins Sepúlveda (2004) . 22 Refi riéndose a esta norma, Italo Merello indica que: "no se ve en este precepto referencia a ningún tipo de móvil que actúe como acicate de la voluntad de la víctima explotada por la lesión: no hay indicación subjetiva de causas. Basta la pura existencia objetiva de un determinado arco de desequilibrio patrimonial para que actúe como causa rescisoria, sin que se exija en absoluto que la violación a la justicia conmutativa se haya llevado a cabo por candidez, apremio, impericia u otras circunstancias. Igual que en el tratamiento de la lesión en la compraventa (…) solo se destaca una relación de desequilibrio entre el valor de las prestaciones de las partes. Véase Merello (1979) p. 104. 23 Así opina Baudry-Lacantinerie, quien dice: "Una vez pronunciada la rescisión, el comprador está obligado a restituir el inmueble vendido, pero es libre para evitar esa restitución pagando el suplemento del justo precio con la deducción establecida. En cuanto al vendedor, no puede exigir este suplemento, cuyo pago es una simple facultad para el comprador. La obligación que este tiene, después que se ha pronunciado la rescisión no es una nado al otro. No se otorga a la víctima de la lesión. Se trata de un derecho que deberá ser ejercido solo una vez que se establezca, por sentencia ejecutoriada, la existencia de lesión enorme. Antes, solo existirá una probabilidad de lesión, que solo se transforma en certeza con la sentencia fi rme.
Cabe destacar que en el Proyecto de 1842, el título XXII, artículo 57 inc. 2º otorgaba la posibilidad al contratante que incurrió en la lesión, de "dar por nula la venta". El cambio a la normativa actual, que se produjo en el Proyecto de 1853, trajo consigo una mayor propiedad en el uso del lenguaje jurídico. Esto, porque el contratante no "da por nula" la venta, sino que solicita la nulidad al juez, siendo este último quien la declara, no el contratante. Así, en una etapa intermedia, en el Proyecto de 1847, art. 380 inc. 2º, se mencionaba la frase "pedir la nulidad", claramente más perfecta que la del citado Proyecto de 1842, y todavía más perfecta que la defi nitiva "consentir en la nulidad".
También en el Proyecto de 1842 se establecía que, de optar la parte vencida por mantener los efectos del contrato, debía enterar el precio (comprador) o restituir (vendedor) previa avaluación de peritos. La idea de la avaluación pericial fue muy probablemente extraída de la normativa del Code Napoléon, que la contempla para acreditar la existencia de lesión enorme 24 . La norma no prosperó, siendo descartada por Bello ya en el Proyecto de 1847. Con todo, debemos destacar que en los litigios en que se ventila la existencia de lesión, resulta prácticamente ineludible recurrir al dictamen de los peritos 25 .
EFECTOS DEL EJERCICIO DE LA OPCIÓN
El contratante vencido consiente en la rescisión
Como primera prevención -de tipo semántico-, debemos decir que el contratante vencido no "consiente" en la rescisión. La rescisión es nulidad, y como tal ha de importar una sanción legal, que se aplica sin atender a la voluntad de las partes. Si existe la causal de nulidad y se prueban los hechos invocados como fundamento de la acción, el contrato debe ser dejado sin efecto y, con ello, producirse la extinción de las obligaciones en él contenidas. Sin embargo, se entiende el sentido en que Bello utilizó la palabra consentir. Así como el contratante vencido tiene un derecho de opción que contempla mantener vigente el contrato, tiene también la posibilidad de "consentir", o más bien resignarse a que los efectos de la rescisión se produzcan. obligación alternativa (…) es una obligación facultativa". Cfr. Baudry-Lacantinerie: De la vente, número 726, p. 728, citado por Alessandri (1918) p. 1131. 24 El art. 1677 del Code, señala que "no podrá admitirse la prueba de la lesión sino por sentencia, y solo en el caso de ser los hechos articulados bastante verosímiles y graves para hacer presumir la lesión". El artículo siguiente es categórico en cuanto a que "esta prueba no puede hacerse sino por el informe de tres peritos, los cuales estarán obligados a formar entre todos una sola sumaria y dar un solo dictamen a pluralidad de sus votos". 25 Por citar un par de ejemplos: Moisés Vergara con Luis Vergara (2008): "Considerando octavo. Que la doctrina y jurisprudencia de nuestros tribunales reiteradamente han señalado que para determinar en este tipo de juicios el justo [precio] de venta de una propiedad es menester de forma imprescindible que se efectúe un informe pericial de la propiedad en litigio y si aquella probanza no se produjera en el juicio, indefectiblemente procede que el tribunal rechace la acción intentada al respecto"; Patricio Eugenio Díaz Broughton y otros con Inmobiliaria Plamher S.A. (2009).
Al tratarse de una nulidad, es aplicable el artículo 1687, en cuanto restituye a las partes "al mismo estado en que se hallarían si no hubiese existido el acto o contrato nulo". Deberán, por tanto, aplicarse las reglas generales sobre nulidad, salvo que -por un principio de especialidad-la ley las modifi que. Esto último sucede en lo dispuesto por el artículo 1895, que ordena al comprador que deba restituir la cosa, purifi carla previamente de los derechos reales constituidos sobre ella. La norma constituye una clara excepción a los efectos generales de la nulidad, puesto que el efecto retroactivo no es tan intenso como para hacer desaparecer ipso iure los demás derechos reales que existen sobre la cosa. Con ello se busca proteger los derechos adquiridos por los terceros, sin sujetarlos a la incertidumbre de la declaración de nulidad de actos celebrados tiempo atrás sobre la cosa.
Como hemos mencionado con anterioridad, el inciso segundo del art. 1890 señala que "no se deberán intereses o frutos sino desde la fecha de la demanda, ni podrá pedirse cosa alguna en razón de las expensas que haya ocasionado el contrato".
En cuanto a los frutos, este artículo considera al contratante vencido como poseedor de buena fe, ya que, hasta entablarse la acción de rescisión, el comprador ignoraba la existencia de una desigualdad intolerable en las prestaciones. No es más que una aplicación del concepto de buena fe consagrado en el artículo 706. Y es, también, una excepción al art. 907 inc. 3º, que exime al poseedor de buena fe de restituir los frutos percibidos antes de la contestación de la demanda. El artículo 1890, en cambio, se basa en la interposición de la demanda, no en su contestación.
Respecto de los intereses, estos solo se deben desde la fecha de la demanda 26 ; en consecuencia, desde el tiempo que media entre la celebración del contrato y la demanda, nada se debe por este concepto.
El inciso segundo del artículo 1890 es muy similar a su par del Code Civil. El artícu-lo 1682 inciso 2º del Code indica que si el comprador prefi ere devolver la cosa y recobrar el precio, restituye también los frutos desde el día de la demanda. El inciso 3º, por su parte, ordena que -asimismo-le corra el interés del precio que pagó desde el día de la misma demanda, o desde el día del pago, si no ha percibido frutos.
Tal como sostiene Alessandri, es bastante probable que la fuente remota de Bello en esta materia haya sido Pothier. En efecto, se puede comparar lo dispuesto en nuestro art. 1890 respecto de las expensas del contrato, con la frase de Pothier: "le vendeur qui a vendu de bonne foi n'est tenu qu'à la restitution du prix, et non au remboursement des frais du contrat, et de tout ce qu'il en a coûté à l'acheteur pour l'acquisition". La parte fi nal del art. 1890, es muy similar, ya que impide pedir "cosa alguna en razón de las expensas que haya ocasionado el contrato".
Hasta este momento, hemos efectuado el análisis del derecho de opción del contratante vencido como si proviniera de una verdadera nulidad. Pero eso es algo perfectamente discutible.
En primer lugar, es extraño que el contratante vencido, luego de haberse declarado por sentencia fi rme la existencia de la nulidad del contrato, pueda hacer subsistir la compraventa restableciendo la igualdad en las prestaciones. Si ya existe cosa juzgada en ese jui-cio, ¿por qué la ley permite una suerte de "resurrección" del contrato, que ya había muerto con la sentencia 27 ?
Algunos autores se han preguntado si la lesión enorme es un vicio del consentimiento y, al contestar esa interrogante -en forma negativa-, han agregado que la acción rescisoria que emana de la lesión es particular y sus efectos no se rigen por las normas del Título XX del Libro IV del Código Civil, sino por reglas especiales que el Código da en cada caso en que sanciona la lesión y, en especial las contenidas en el Párrafo "De la rescisión de la venta por lesión enorme 28 .
Como puede verse, la rescisión en análisis presenta propiedades muy singulares que la diferencian de otras especies de nulidad 29 . Esto nos lleva a preguntarnos si la rescisión por lesión enorme en la compraventa es una verdadera nulidad; o se trata de una "nulidad sui generis", regulada por Bello en términos tan peculiares que no es posible enmarcarla en los cánones clásicos del Código Civil.
El contratante vencido restablece la igualdad perdida
Si el contratante vencido opta por restablecer el justo equilibrio en la contratación, desaparece con ello la causa para alegar la rescisión y los efectos del contrato pueden mantenerse. Esto implica, en primer lugar, que el comprador podrá conservar la cosa comprada y, si es el vendedor quien ha sufrido la lesión, podrá obtener un precio justo por la cosa que vendió.
Siendo el comprador el contratante vencido en el juicio, podrá completar el justo precio con deducción de una décima parte. Al contrario, si resulta vencido el vendedor -por haber sido él quien provocó la desigualdad-, podrá restituir el justo precio aumentado en una décima parte.
EL PROBLEMA DE LA DÉCIMA PARTE
Lo primero que podríamos preguntarnos es el porqué de la diferencia de un décimo del precio, que conservan las partes y no restituyen a la otra.
La diferencia del diez por ciento que las partes pueden conservar para sí, se ha explicado en doctrina porque ese margen consiste en la legítima ganancia que las partes pueden adquirir producto de la venta, ya que se reconoce como natural el que las cosas no se compren con exactitud al precio que realmente valen 30 .
Tal diferencia, fundada en una supuesta legítima ganancia de las partes, resulta improcedente y, como veremos más adelante, problemática.
Es improcedente, porque si se ha pronunciado la rescisión de la venta por sentencia fi rme, es porque ha habido tal desigualdad en las prestaciones, que la ley da la posibilidad a la parte afectada de retrotraer los efectos del contrato al estado anterior a la venta. Ha existido una diferencia tan grande entre las prestaciones de ambas partes que se ha tornado intolerable, y por eso la ley la sanciona. Pero luego, la misma ley -viniendo contra su acto propio-, permite, al que ha causado la lesión, conservar una ganancia que es de suyo ilícita. En otras palabras, ese margen de un décimo resulta injusto, porque proviene del perjuicio experimentado por una parte y que solo se hubiese justifi cado si hubiese provenido de un contrato celebrado en condiciones mínimamente equitativas, y no es el caso.
Por otro lado, es una diferencia problemática, porque es inductiva a error. La frase utilizada por el artículo al referirse a la opción del vendedor es ambigua. Dice el art. 1890 inciso 1º, en la parte referida: "y el vendedor en el mismo caso, podrá a su arbitrio consentir en la rescisión, o restituir el exceso del precio recibido sobre el justo precio aumentado en una décima parte". Esta frase puede ser entendida de dos maneras que nos llevarían a soluciones bien distintas.
Una primera alternativa sería considerar que lo que se aumenta es el justo precio y ese resultado a su vez se resta de lo recibido. Así, si el justo precio es 100 y el comprador ha pagado 210, el justo precio debe ser aumentado en una décima parte (110) y esto se resta a los 210 recibidos por el vendedor. Es decir, este último devuelve 100.
Una segunda alternativa implica interpretar que el aumento de un décimo a que se refi ere la norma, se aplica sobre "el exceso del precio recibido sobre el justo precio". Tomando los datos anteriores, si el justo precio es 100 y el exceso del precio recibido sobre el justo precio es 110 (210-100), debemos aumentar esta cifra en un décimo. Con lo que concluimos que el vendedor ya no restituye 100, sino 121.
Ilustremos un poco mejor el ejemplo dado: si Pedro es el vendedor, ha sufrido lesión enorme porque vendió el predio en 40 millones, en circunstancias de que el justo precio es 100 millones. Como se ha decretado la rescisión, si Juan (comprador) quiere mantener los efectos del contrato, deberá pagar a Pedro 50 millones. Tal cantidad resulta al restarle al justo precio un décimo (quedando 90 millones), menos la cantidad efectivamente pagada (40 millones). Por otro lado, si quien sufre la lesión enorme es ahora Juan, signifi ca que él ha pagado más de 200 millones. Pensemos que pagó 210. Para que Pedro pueda mantener vigente los efectos del contrato, deberá restituir al comprador 100 millones. Dicha cifra resulta de aplicar en forma correcta lo dispuesto en el artículo 1890 inc. 1º, que impone al vendedor la obligación de "restituir el exceso del precio recibido sobre el justo precio aumentado en una décima parte". Lo que signifi ca que primero hay que establecer a cuánto asciende "el justo precio aumentado en una décima parte" -que son 110 millones-, para luego proceder a restarlos del precio pagado por el comprador (210 millones-110 millones), dando el resultado fi nal de 100 millones.
Hubiese sido menos confl ictivo que Bello permitiera restablecer a las partes al estado anterior, sin la posibilidad de conservar de la ganancia de la décima parte. De ser así, si el vendedor hubiese experimentado lesión enorme -al vender a menos de la mitad del justo precio-, el comprador hubiese eliminado la lesión al enterar lo que faltaba para completar el justo precio. Y al revés, si fuese el comprador el lesionado, el vendedor podría evitar los efectos de la rescisión devolviéndole al primero lo recibido en exceso del justo precio.
EL PROBLEMA DE LA DESIGUALDAD DE TRATO HACIA EL VENDEDOR Y COMPRADOR
La doctrina ha opinado en reiteradas ocasiones que la ley no trata de igual manera al comprador que al vendedor, dándole una ventaja a este último 31 . En gran medida, los que así opinan tienen razón. Esto, porque el empobrecimiento que requiere el vendedor para alegar lesión es mucho menor que el que necesita experimentar el comprador.
Así, si el justo precio es 100, el vendedor tiene que haber recibido menos de la mitad del justo precio, por ejemplo: 49. En este caso, el empobrecimiento que ha experimentado el vendedor es de 51. En cambio, para que el comprador pueda alegar lesión enorme, debió de haber pagado más del doble del justo precio, por ejemplo: 201. En el mismo ejemplo, el vendedor se vio perjudicado en 49 y el comprador en 101.
¿De dónde proviene, entonces, esta disposición del Código que trata con mayor benevolencia al vendedor lesionado que al comprador?
Esto tiene una explicación histórica, relacionada directamente con las fuentes que sirvieron a Bello para perfi lar la institución. El origen de la interrogante planteada puede resumirse en el confl icto laesio ultra dimidium versus laesio ultra duplum, que Guzmán Brito se ha encargado de desarrollar en Chile 32 .
El confl icto se remonta a los glosadores Azo, por un lado, y Martino y compañía, por otro, que utilizaron formas distintas de calcular la lesión. De este modo, Azo interpretaba la Lex 2 aplicando la misma medida a ambos contratantes, aplicando "la fracción mitad siempre al justo precio de la cosa: el vendedor sufre lesión si recibe un precio inferior a la mitad del justo precio de aquella; y el comprador, si paga un precio mayor al justo precio más su mitad también de aquella" 33 -criterio ultra dimidium-; y Martino, en cambio, aplicaba "la fracción mitad a valores distintos: al justo precio de la cosa en el caso del vendedor (cuando recibe un precio inferior a la mitad del justo precio de ella), y al precio pagado en el caso del comprador 31 Véase, por ejemplo, Henríquez (1904) , p. 14. 32 Para examinar con detalle los criterios seguidos por el Código para medir la lesión, ver Guzmán Brito (2005) p. 207 a 251. 33 Guzmán Brito (2005) p. 214.
